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Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enter-
prises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders
can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the
commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or
negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution
may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it
cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the
latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To
avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufﬁciently
numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social
trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at
a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of
(a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of volun-
tary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally
improves the efﬁciency of incentives. In particular, optional partic-
ipation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the
social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally
stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and
implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded
by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long
run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of
cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a “ligh-
ter touch” than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at con-
siderably lower cost.
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In many species, cooperation has evolved through natural se-lection. In human societies, it can additionally be promoted
through institutions. Institutions may be viewed as “tools that
offer incentives to enable humans to overcome social dilemmas,”
to paraphrase Ostrom (1). The threat of punishment or the
promise of reward can induce self-interested players to prefer
actions that sustain the public good, and turn away from free-
riding (2–13).
It is easy to understand the outcome of public good games in
terms of the size of the incentive. If the incentive is too small, it
has no effect and selﬁsh players keep defecting by refraining
from contributing to the public good (Fig. 1a). If, on the other
hand, the incentive is sufﬁciently large, it compels all players to
cooperate by contributing to the public good (Fig. 1d). It is the
range of intermediate incentives that is of interest, and here, the
effects of positive and negative incentives differ. Rewarding
causes the stable coexistence of defectors and cooperators, with
a larger proportion of cooperators when rewards are higher (Fig.
1b). Punishing, in contrast, leads to alternative stable states. As
a result of the competition between cooperators and defectors,
one or the other behavior will become established, but there can
be no long-term coexistence (Fig. 1c). Whatever behavior pre-
vails initially becomes fully established. Thus, each of the two
behaviors may be viewed as a social norm: As long as the others
stick to it, it does not pay to deviate. In particular, when cooper-
ators are initially rare, the population will remain trapped in the
asocial norm, with everyone defecting. Social learning cannot lead,
in that case, to the more beneﬁcial, prosocial norm of cooperating.
Here, we show that the option to abstain from the joint en-
terprise (14–17) offers an escape from the social trap. Indeed,
when free-riding is the norm, players will turn away from un-
promising joint ventures. This leads to the decline of exploiters
and allows the reemergence of cooperators. If the incentives are
too low, this is followed by the comeback of defectors, in a rock-
paper-scissors type of cycle (18, 19) (Fig. 2a). However, even
a modest degree of punishment breaks the rock-paper-scissors
cycle and allows the ﬁxation of the cooperative norm (Fig. 2 e–g).
Thus, optional participation allows a permanent escape from the
social trap. In contrast, we show that optional participation has
little impact on rewarding systems (Fig. 2 b–d).
Methods
Speciﬁcally, we apply evolutionary game theory (20) to cultural evolution,
based on (a) social learning (i.e., the preferential imitation of more suc-
cessful strategies) and (b) occasional exploratory steps (modeled as small and
rare random perturbations). Because the diversity of public good inter-
actions and sanctioning mechanisms is huge, we ﬁrst present a fully ana-
lytical investigation of a prototypical case (SI Text). We posit a large, well-
mixed population of players. From time to time, a random sample of n ≥ 2
players is faced with an opportunity to participate in a public good game, at
a cost g > 0. We denote by m the number of players willing to participate
(0 ≤m ≤ n) and assume that m ≥ 2 players are required for the game to take
place. If it does, each of the m players decides whether or not to contribute
a ﬁxed amount c > 0, knowing that it will be multiplied by r (with 1 < r < n)
and distributed equally among all m − 1 other members of the group. If
all group members invest into the common pool, each obtains a payoff
(r − 1)c − g, which we assume to be positive. The social dilemma arises be-
cause players can improve their payoffs by not contributing. If all do so, each
obtains the negative payoff −g. Thus, they would have done better to re-
frain from participation.
We now introduce the incentive. It is convenient to write the total in-
centive stipulated by an authority (“the institution”) in the form mI, where I
is the per capita incentive. If rewards are used, the total incentive will be
shared among those players who cooperated. Hence, each cooperator
obtains a reward mI/mC, where mC denotes the number of cooperators
among the m players. If penalties are used, players who defect have their
payoffs analogously reduced by mI/mD, where mD denotes the number of
defectors among the m players. We will see that in the compulsory case,
there exist two alternative stable norms for intermediate strength of pun-
ishment. In particular, a homogeneous population of defectors is unable to
escape from the social trap (Fig. 1). In the optional case, cultural evolution
leads to a stable homogeneous population of cooperators (Fig. 2 e–g),
irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. Thus, voluntary participa-
tion overcomes the social trap plaguing the compulsory case. Remarkably,
this is achieved at a fraction 1/n of the cost necessary in the compulsory case
(SI Text, S2).
We base our analysis of the underlying evolutionary game on replicator
dynamics (e.g., 20) for the three strategies C (cooperators), D (defectors), and
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N (nonparticipants), with frequencies x, y, and z. The state space Δ is the
triangle of all (x, y, z) with x, y, z ≥ 0 and x + y + z = 1. If 0 < g < (r − 1)c, these
three strategies form a rock-scissors-paper cycle in the absence of incentives,
as shown in Fig. 2a: D beats C, N beats D, and C beats N. In the interior of the
state space, all trajectories of the replicator dynamics originate from, and
converge to, the state N of nonparticipation (z = 1) (21). Hence, cooperation
can only emerge in brief bursts, sparked by random perturbations. The long-
term payoff is that of nonparticipants (i.e., 0).
Results
If the game is compulsory [i.e., if all n players are obliged to
participate (z = 0)], the outcome changes with increasing per
capita incentive I (Fig. 1). For small I, defection dominates. The
replicator dynamics have two equilibria: one stable (a homoge-
neous population of D-players) and one unstable (a homoge-
neous population of C-players). In the case of rewarding, as I
crosses the threshold I− = c/n, the equilibrium D becomes un-
stable, spawning a stable equilibrium R at a mixture of C- and D-
players. As I increases further, the fraction of cooperators
becomes larger and larger. Finally, when I reaches the threshold
I+ = c, the stable mixture merges with the formerly unstable
equilibrium C, which becomes stable. In the case of punishing, as
I crosses the threshold I−, it is the unstable equilibrium C that
becomes stable, spawning an unstable equilibrium R at a mixture
of C- and D-players. R thus separates the regions of attraction of
the equilibria C and D. With increasing I, the region of attraction
of D becomes smaller and smaller, until I attains the value I+.
Here, the unstable equilibrium R merges with the formerly stable
equilibrium D, which becomes unstable. For larger values of I,
everyone cooperates. As shown in SI Text, S2, the values of I+
and I− are the same, irrespective of whether we consider re-
warding or punishing.
We next investigate the interplay of (a) institutional incentives
and (b) optional participation. Clearly, if the public good game is
too expensive [i.e., if g ≥ (r − 1)c + I in the case of rewarding or
g ≥ (r − 1)c in the case of punishing], players will opt for non-
participation. We do not further consider this trivial case.
We ﬁrst examine the case of punishing, for increasing per
capita incentives I. For I < I−, the effect of the incentive is
negligible and all trajectories converge to N. As I crosses the
threshold I−, the equilibrium R appears on the CD-edge. At ﬁrst,
it is a saddle point. A trajectory leading from N to R separates
the interior of the triangle Δ into two regions (Fig. 2e). One
region is ﬁlled with trajectories issuing from N and converging to
C, and the other is ﬁlled with trajectories issuing from and
returning to N. If we assume that arbitrarily small random per-
turbations can, from time to time, affect the population (corre-
sponding to occasional individual explorations of an alternative
strategy), we see that the population will eventually end up at the
stable equilibrium C. If I increases beyond a threshold K−, an
equilibrium Q enters the triangle Δ at R through a saddle-node
bifurcation. With increasing I, the point Q moves along a straight
line to N, whereas R keeps moving, along the CD-edge, to D
(Fig. 2f). In SI Text, we show that Q is the unique equilibrium in
the interior of the state space Δ (i.e., with all three strategies
present) and that it is a saddle point. If I increases still further
and crosses a threshold K+, the equilibrium Q exits the triangle
Δ through N. The point R becomes a source and remains so until
it merges with D (for I = I+) (Fig. 2g). Almost all trajectories in
Δ either converge directly to C or to N. However, N is not stable.
If the population is in the vicinity of N, arbitrarily small and rare
random perturbations will eventually send it into the region of
attraction of C. Hence, the population ultimately settles at the
stable equilibrium C whenever I > I−. This means that as soon as
a homogeneous population of cooperators is immune against
invasion by rare defectors, it becomes established in the long run.
In the case of rewarding, for I < I−, the incentive has a negli-
gible effect and all trajectories converge to N. As I crosses the
threshold I−, the equilibrium R appears on the CD-edge. Again,
it is a saddle, but a trajectory now leads away from R to N (Fig.
2b). It separates a region where all trajectories lead from D to N
from a region ﬁlled with trajectories issuing from and returning
to N. As I increases and crosses a threshold J−, a saddle-node
bifurcation occurs at R, spawning an equilibrium Q into the
triangle Δ (Fig. 2c). Again, one can show that this interior
equilibrium is unique, and is a saddle point (SI Text). If I crosses
a threshold J+, the equilibrium Q exits the triangle Δ through N.
All trajectories in the interior of the triangle Δ converge to R
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Fig. 1. Effects of institutional rewarding and punishing on the compulsory public good game for different per capita incentives I. For rewarding and
punishing, full cooperation requires large incentives, even though the transition from full defection to full cooperation differs for the two types of incentive
(b and c). (a) If I is smaller than I− = c/n, the incentives have no effect on the outcome of the public good game and defection prevails. (d) If I is larger than I+ =
c, the incentives reverse the outcome and cooperation prevails. (b and c) For intermediate incentive I, rewarding leads to the stable coexistence of co-
operation and defection, whereas punishing leads to alternative stable states. C and D correspond to the two homogeneous states in which the population
consists exclusively of cooperators and defectors, respectively. With increasing incentive I, the equilibrium R moves toward C in the case of rewarding and
toward D in the case of punishing.
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(Fig. 2d). As I increases beyond I+, the stable equilibrium R
merges with C and all trajectories converge to C, just as in the
case of punishment (Fig. 2h).
For enhancing a group’s welfare, rewarding obviously works
better than punishing (just as in the classic behaviorist analysis of
reinforcements). However, the price of the rewarding has to be
substantial. Punishing can achieve all-out cooperation (in the
long run) for a much smaller price, namely, I− (which is smaller
the larger the group). From the viewpoint of institutionalizing
a sanctioning mechanism, punishing thus has an advantage over
rewarding: It achieves a higher average payoff at lower costs.
So far, we have treated g (the price an individual is willing to
pay to participate in a joint enterprise) and I (the per capita size
of the total incentive) as independent parameters. However, if
individuals can freely decide whether or not to participate in the
game, it makes sense to assume that they pay for the institution
providing the incentives. For instance, I could be some fraction
of the entrance cost g, or (equivalently) the total entrance cost
could be viewed as the sum g + aI of a part g kept by the au-
thority and a part aI used for the incentive, with a > 0 (it is
natural to assume that this part is proportional to the per capita
incentive I). A rewarding system, if a = 1, simply redistributes
the payoff without increasing group welfare, whereas a punishing
system decreases it even if no one has to be punished. (We have
to pay for the costly apparatus of law enforcement even if no
one defaults.)
In the case of rewarding, optional participation increases the
group welfare only marginally to 0 (Fig. 3b), for the small range
I− < I < J−, where compulsory participation leads to negative
average payoffs. In that range, combining rewarding with op-
tional participation even reduces the cooperator frequency to
0 (Fig. 3a). For punishing, the situation is very different. The
group welfare is highest when I is just barely larger than the
minimum I− = c/n required to obtain full cooperation (Fig. 3d).
The learning process, in that case, will take some time, and the
population can undergo violent oscillations between the N-, C-,
and D-states; however, in the end, the C-norm will prevail
(Fig. 3c).
In SI Text, we test by extensive numerical investigations the
robustness of our analytical results with respect to alternative
model variants:
i) If we assume that part of the contribution to the public good
returns to the contributing player, the dynamics become more
complex but the evolutionary outcome remains unchanged
(SI Text, S3 and Figs. S1 and S2).
ii) Requiring participants to pay a fee for the sanctioning system
also has little effect on the predicted outcome, as long as
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Fig. 2. Effects of institutional rewarding and punishing on the optional public good game for different per capita incentives I. Combining punishing with
optional participation enables full cooperation for a small fraction of the cost needed in the compulsory case. The triangles Δ represent the state space
Δ = {(x, y, z): x, y, z ≥ 0, x + y + z = 1}, where x, y, and z are the frequencies of cooperators, defectors, and nonparticipants, respectively. The three vertices C, D,
and N correspond to the three homogeneous states in which the population consists exclusively of cooperators (x = 1), defectors (y = 1), or nonparticipants (z =
1). (a) If I is smaller than I− = c/n, the incentives have no effect on the outcome of the public good game. The interior of the triangle Δ is ﬁlled with trajectories
issuing from and converging to the vertex N of nonparticipation in the joint enterprise. In that state, arbitrarily small random perturbations lead to short
bursts of cooperation, immediately subverted by defection and followed by a return to nonparticipation. (h) If I is larger than I+ = c, the incentives alter the
outcome and cooperation prevails. All trajectories converge to C, the state of full cooperation. For the range of incentives in between a and h, the impacts of
rewards and penalties differ. Rewarding: (b) For I− < I < J−, the equilibrium R on the CD-edge is a saddle point. All trajectories in the interior of the triangle Δ
lead to N. (c) For J− < I < J+, an interior saddle point Q moves, with increasing I, along the dashed line from the CD-edge to N. Trajectories either converge to R,
now a sink, or else to N. From there, an arbitrarily small random perturbation will send the state into the region of attraction of R. (d) For J+ < I < I+, the
interior equilibrium Q has exited through N, and all trajectories converge to R, implying stable coexistence of defectors and cooperators. Punishing: (e) For
I− < I < K−, the equilibrium R on the CD-edge is a saddle point. A trajectory from N to R separates a region where all trajectories lead to C from a region where
all trajectories lead to N. An arbitrarily small random perturbation of N can lead to the region of attraction of C, and hence to the ﬁxation of full cooperation.
(f) For K− < I < K+, an interior saddle point Q moves, with increasing I, along the dashed line from the CD-edge to N. R is now a source. (g) For
K+ < I < I+, the interior equilibrium Q has exited through N. In f and g, trajectories converge to C, either directly, or after a small random perturbation away
from N. In summary, combining punishing with optional participation causes full cooperation from any initial condition for per capita incentives exceeding I−,
whereas combining rewarding with optional participation achieves this only for per capita incentives exceeding I+. Parameters: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, g = 0.5, and
I = 0 (a); 0.25 (b and e); 0.35 (c); 0.55 (f); 0.7 (d and g); or (punishment) 1.2 (h).
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this fee does not become unreasonably large (Fig. 3 and SI
Text, S5).
iii) Moreover, when unused fees are returned, small negative
per capita incentives sufﬁce to maximize social welfare
(SI Text, S5).
We can also model the sanctioning system in different ways.
Results remain unchanged as long as reward, or punishment,
decreases with the number of free-riders:
iv) This is the case, for instance, if only one defector is exem-
plarily punished, because the probability for being singled out
decreases [in the old Navy, the slowest sailor was liable to get
“prompted,” (i.e., beaten)] (SI Text, S4).
v) It also holds whenever the institution needs to spend some
resource (e.g., time) to punish a convicted free-rider. Indeed,
this diminishes the resources to hunt for other free-riders.
Such a “handling time” [to borrow an expression from pred-
ator–prey models (22)] will reduce the average punishment
expected per defector, which is proportional to mI/(a +
bmD), with a, b > 0 (SI Text, S4).
vi) Also, the capping of individual penalties leaves our qualitative
ﬁndings unchanged (SI Text, S4). For these and related scenar-
ios, optional participation leads to the establishment of full
cooperation whenever the sanction is strong enough to deter
free-riders from invading.
Surprisingly, in all cases we have considered, the cost of the
negative incentive required to establish a norm of full cooperation
is a small fraction of the cost needed in the case of compulsory
participation.
Discussion
In his famous Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes stressed the
necessity of an authority to curb the selﬁsh motivations of indi-
viduals. He attributed its existence to a social contract intended
to promote the commonwealth. Here, we assume that such
a Leviathan-like authority exists, and is able to provide sanctions
in the form of penalties and rewards. Indeed, most of our joint
enterprises are protected by an elaborate apparatus of regu-
lations, controls, and contract-enforcement devices to provide
the necessary coercion. The theory of the social contract is
a major topic in political philosophy, and a rich ﬁeld of appli-
cations for game theory (e.g., 13).
The large majority of economic experiments and theoretical
studies dealing with sanctions use peer-punishment, and thus
make do without Leviathan, at least at ﬁrst sight. Players can
decide, independent of each other, whether to punish coplayers
or not. This setting is of particular interest for investigating how
prosocial coercion evolved, out of a world of anarchy (e.g., 1).
Studies of peer-punishment attempt to address such a scenario
(23–32). It seems clear, however, that in all economic experi-
ments, Leviathan looms in the background. Players can pick
their decisions, but usually only in a very narrow, regularized
framework of alternatives. In modern human societies, anarchy is
rare and players can almost always appeal to a higher authority.
There are many intermediate stages between pure peer-pun-
ishment and institutionalized punishment. Several authors have
considered scenarios in which punishment is meted out only if
two, or a majority, of players opt for it, or have allowed players to
vote between treatments with or without peer-punishment (33–
35). Thus, sanctions were supported by some social consensus,
which can be mediated by communication [“cheap talk” (36)]. In
other studies, players could contribute, before engaging in the
public good game, to a punishment pool. This is like paying the
wages of a police force before knowing whether, or against
whom, it will be deployed (4, 37). Both theory and experiments
have shown that delegating punishment is an efﬁcient way to
promote cooperation (38–40). Often, however, players of a pub-
lic good game can engage in second-order free-riding by not
paying toward the sanctions, which, in turn, raises the issue of
second-order punishment. In our model, whoever wants to join
the game has to pay an entrance fee. Second-order free-riding is
no option, nor is asocial punishment targeted against coopera-
tors (30). Leviathan sees to it.
The interplay of punishing, on the one hand, and optional
participation, on the other hand, has already been investigated in
several papers (21, 41–43). However, these studies mainly ex-
amined the problem of second-order free-riding. In contrast to
these papers, we consider institutional punishment enforced by
a higher authority. In our study, evolutionary game theory is
applied to the implementation of an authority through social
contract (by allowing individuals to voluntarily participate in a
joint interaction). This establishes an interesting analogy with the
suppression of competition occurring in several ﬁelds of evolu-
tionary biology (e.g., “selﬁsh genes”) (44).
Voluntary submission under a sanctioning institution occurs
in many real-life instances of cooperation. Practically all joint
commercial and industrial enterprises are protected by en-
forceable contracts. Adherence is voluntary but commits the
parties to mutually beneﬁcial contributions. Punitive clauses
ensure that noncompliance will be sanctioned. This principle
also works, although at a less regulated level, in small-scale so-
cieties (1, 5, 38) and permits the sustainable use of common
grazing or ﬁshing grounds, or the construction and maintenance
of irrigation systems. Medieval guilds delegated authority to
chosen agents, and settlers hired sheriffs to deter villains. In day-
to-day life, we may think of janitors, umpires, referees, or war-
dens who uphold rules in housing blocks, team games, private
clubs, or public parks. All these examples rely on formal or in-
formal agreements that can be freely joined but are then backed
up by a higher authority. Thus, the situation we have addressed
in our model is both fundamental and widespread.
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